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RONALD K. PLATTS, dba : 
E-Z STREET AUTO, : 
Defendant/Appellant/Cross- : 
Appellee. : 
: Case No. 930283-CA 
Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
In this appeal and cross-appeal, Defendant/Appellant/Cross-
Appellee Ronald K. Platts dba E-Z Street Auto ("E-Z Street") 
appeals from a judgment entered against him after a bench trial for 
violation of the federal odometer fraud statute, 15 U.S.C. § 1981 
et seq., and for fraud. Plaintiff/Appellee/Cross-Appellant Mark 
Erickson ("Erickson") cross-appeals that judgment claiming that he 
should have been awarded three times the amount of actual damages 
he sustained, as provided for under 15 U.S.C. § 1989. This Court 
has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(d) (1992). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Cross-Appellant identifies the following issues on appeal: 
1. Did the trial court correctly deny Erickson's claim for 
damages in the amount of three times his actual damages as provided 
pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1989 (federal odometer fraud statute)? 
This issue is a question of statutory interpretation, which is 
reviewed under a correction of error standard, according no 
deference to the trial court's interpretation. Scharf v. BMG Corp. 
700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985); Automotive Manufacturers Warehouse, Inc. 
v. Service Auto Parts, Inc., 596 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1979). 
2. Did the trial court correctly construe 15 U.S.C. § 1988 
to enter judgment against E-Z Street for purposefully professing 
ignorance regarding the exact mileage of the vehicle, and thus 
showing a reckless disregard for the truth? 
This issue is a question of statutory interpretation, which is 
reviewed under a correction of error standard, according no 
deference to the trial court's interpretation. Scharf v. BMG Corp. 
700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985); Automotive Manufacturers Warehouse, Inc. 
v. Service Auto Parts, Inc., 596 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1979). 
3. Did the trial court correctly grant Erickson the remedy 
of rescission of the Purchase Agreement? 
This issue is a question of law and will be reviewed using a 
correction of error standard. Scharf v. BMG Corp. 700 P.2d 1068 
(Utah 1985); Automotive Manufacturers Warehouse, Inc. v. Service 
Auto Parts, Inc., 596 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1979). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
§ 1981. Congressional findings and declaration of purpose 
The Congress hereby finds that purchasers when 
buying motor vehicles rely heavily on the odometer 
reading as index of the condition and value of such 
vehicle; that purchasers are entitled to rely on the 
odometer reading as an accurate reflection of the mileage 
actually traveled by the vehicle; that an accurate 
indication of the mileage traveled by a motor vehicles 
assists the purchaser in determining its safety and 
reliability; and that motor vehicles move in the current 
of interstate and foreign commerce or affect such 
commerce. It is therefore the purpose of this subchapter 
to prohibit tampering with odometers on motor vehicles 
and to establish certain safeguards for the protection of 
purchaser with respect to the sale of motor vehicles 
having altered or reset odometers. 
(Pub.L. 92-513, Title IV, § 401, Oct. 20, 1972, 86 Stat. 
961. ) 
§ 1988. Disclosure requirements upon transfer of 
ownership of motor vehicle 
Promulgation of rules 
(a) Not later than 90 days after October 20, 1972, the 
Secretary shall prescribe rules requiring any transferor 
to give the following written disclosure to the 
transferee in connection with the transfer of ownership 
of a motor vehicle: 
(1) Disclosure of the cumulative mileage 
registered on the odometer. 
(2) Disclosure that the actual mileage is 
unknown, if the odometer reading is known to 
the transferor to be different from the number 
of miles the vehicle has actually traveled. 
Such rules shall prescribe the manner in which 
information shall be disclosed under this section and in 
which such information shall be retained. 
Violation of rules and giving false statements to 
transferees prohibited 
(b) No transferor shall violate any rule prescribed 
under this section or give a false statement to a 
transferee in making any disclosure required by such 
rule. 
3 
Acceptance of incomplete written disclosure by 
transferees acquiring ownership for resale prohibited 
(c) No transferee who, for purposes of resale, acquires 
ownership of a motor vehicle shall accept any written 
disclosure required by any rule prescribed under this 
section if such disclosure is incomplete. 
(Pub.L. 92-513, Title IV, § 408, Oct. 20, 1972, 86 Stat. 
962; Pub.L. 94-364, Title Iv, § 406, July 14, 1976, 90 
Stat. 983.) 
§ 1989. Civil actions to enforce liability for violation 
of odometer requirements; amount of damages; 
jurisdiction; period of limitation 
(a) Any person who, with intent to defraud, violates any 
requirement imposed under this subchapter shall be liable 
in an amount equal to the sum of -
(1) three times the amount of actual damaqes 
sustained or $1,500.00 whichever is the 
greater; and 
(2) in the case of any successful action to 
enforce the foregoing liability, the costs of 
the action together with reasonable attorney 
fees as determined by the court. 
(b) An action to enforce any liability created under 
subsection (a) of this section, may be brought in a 
United States district court without regard to the amount 
in controversy, or in any other court of competent 
jurisdiction within two years from the date on which the 
liability arises. 
(Pub.L. 92-513, Title IV, § 409, Oct. 20, 1972, 86 Stat. 963.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Erickson filed his complaint in this matter on January 10, 
1990, alleging that Appellant defrauded him in the sale of a 
vehicle that had 146,811 actual miles on it, but was sold as having 
approximately 46,811. On January 18, 1990, E-Z Street filed a 
verified answer denying Erickson's claims and counterclaiming for 
damages arising out of breach of contract. 
The case was tried before the Honorable LeRoy H. Griffiths, 
sitting without a jury, on September 29, 1992 and October 19, 1992 
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(R. 92). On November 24, 1992, Judge Griffiths issued a Memorandum 
Decision in favor of Erickson and against E-Z Street (R. 85-88). 
On February 1, 1993, Judge Griffiths signed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and an Order of judgment (R. 92-98). Erickson 
was awarded (1) judgment against E-Z Street; (2) rescission of the 
Purchase Agreement for the vehicle; (3) cancellation of his 
obligation evidenced by his credit card charges for purchase of the 
vehicle; (4) damages of $1,212.80, plus interest at the rate of 10% 
per annum from December 1, 1989 until paid in full; (5) court costs 
of $104.00; and (6) $1,500.00 attorney's fees (R. 99-100). No 
punitive damages were awarded (id.). 
On February 11, 1993, E-Z Street made a Motion to Alter and 
Amend the Judgment and for a New Trial, which was denied on March 
18, 1993. E-Z Street filed its notice of appeal in the Court of 
Appeals on April 22, 1993 (R. 123). Erickson cross-appealed on 
April 28, 1993 (R. 125). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In September 1989, E-Z Street offered a 1980 Volkswagen camper 
van ("vehicle") for sale (R. 85, 92 ).1 On or about September 26, 
1989, Erickson purchased the vehicle from E-Z Street. Erickson 
agreed to pay a total purchase price of $4,291.00 ($4,266.00, plus 
$25.00 for an out of state permit). Erickson paid for the 
vehicle's purchase using two credit cards. Erickson charged 
1
 All the statements in the Statement of Facts come from the 
Memorandum Decision dated November 24, 1992 (contained in the 
record at 85-88, and in this brief in Appendix I), and from the 
Findings and Conclusions of Law (contained in the record at 92-98, 
and in this Brief in Appendix I). 
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$1,291.00 on his American Express card and $3,000.00 on his Visa 
card (R. 86, 93) . 
Approximately one week prior to purchasing the vehicle, 
Erickson test drove the vehicle accompanied by one of E-Z Street's 
salesman, Paul Lives. While on the test drive, Erickson stopped at 
his father-in-law's home. Erickson's wife and his father-in-law 
inspected the vehicle. At this time the odometer indicated that 
the mileage on the vehicle was approximately 48,800 miles. Even 
though the vehicle was relatively old, given the low mileage shown 
on the odometer and the condition of the body, the three felt that 
the vehicle was in good condition (R. 86-87, 93). 
Erickson and Mr. Lives specifically discussed the mileage 
shown on the odometer. Erickson testified that Mr. Lives told him 
that the miles shown were the actual miles. Mr. Lives testified 
that he told Erickson to have the vehicle checked by a mechanic 
because there was "no way" to determine the actual mileage on a car 
that old. 
During the week prior to the vehicle's purchase, Erickson 
spoke with E-Z Street's manager, Ronald Memmott, regarding purchase 
terms. Both Erickson and his wife testified that Mr. Memmott told 
them that the 48,831 miles, as shown on the vehicle's odometer, 
were the actual miles of the vehicle (R. 87-88, 93-94). 
On September 26, 1989, Mr. Memmott, on behalf of E-Z Street, 
finalized the vehicle's purchase with Erickson. Mr. Memmott 
prepared all of the necessary documents transferring ownership of 
the vehicle to Erickson. Mr. Memmott prepared the Purchase 
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Agreement on which he indicated the vehicle's mileage as 48,831. 
Mr. Memmott prepared the Odometer Disclosure Statement which stated 
in pertinent part: 
I, E.Z. Street Auto, state that the odometer . . . now 
reads 48,831 (no tenths) miles and to the best of my 
knowledge that it reflects the actual mileage of the 
vehicle . . . unless one of the following statements is 
checked. 
(1)1 hereby certify that to the best of my knowledge the 
odometer reading reflects the amount of mileage in excess 
of its mechanical limits. 
X (2) I hereby certify that the odometer reading is NOT the 
actual mileage. WARNING ODOMETER DISCREPANCY. 
Mr. Memmott checked statement box by number (2) of the Odometer 
Disclosure Statement. At trial, Mr. Memmott denied that he 
misrepresented the mileage of the vehicle to Erickson, even though 
he knew that the actual mileage was far in excess of 48,831 miles. 
When statement (2) was checked, people were put on notice that 
there was an odometer discrepancy. However, Erickson and his wife 
both testified that Mr. Memmott told both of them that 48,831 was 
the actual mileage on the vehicle (86-88, 93-94). 
Erickson bought the vehicle "as is" and signed statements that 
he realized the vehicle was sold without any warranties. However, 
Erickson believed he was purchasing an automobile with only 48,831 
miles on it, not a vehicle with 148,831 and no warranty. Erickson 
drove the vehicle to his home in Evanston, Wyoming, and during the 
first week of operation he repaired the brakes, tail lights, door 
locks, and installed a new door rear-view mirror, all at a cost of 
$123.24 (R. 86-87, 94-95). 
At the beginning of the second week, Erickson, his wife, and 
their one yaar old daughter, left Evanston to drive to Los Angeles, 
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California. Approximately 80 miles north of Las Vegas, Nevada the 
vehicle broke down and had to be towed to Las Vegas. While in Las 
Vegas, Erickson was told by a Volkswagen repair shop that the 
engine needed a complete overhaul at an estimated cost of 
$2,000.00. He was also told that from the condition of the engine 
it was evident that the actual mileage was greatly in excess of the 
mileage figure shown on the odometer (id. ). 
To avoid ruining their trip to California, Erickson rented a 
car in Las Vegas and continued traveling to Los Angeles. On their 
return trip, Erickson rented a truck large enough to tow the 
vehicle and brought it back to his father-in-law's home in South 
Salt Lake, Utah. It cost $150.34 to rent the car and $939.22 to 
rent the truck (id. ). 
Erickson's father-in-law, who is an experienced Volkswagen 
mechanic, disassembled part of the engine in an attempt to repair 
it. The engine showed evidence of many miles of use, and he 
determined that a complete engine overhaul was necessary. 
Erickson's negotiations to have E-Z Street repair the engine were 
unsuccessful. E-Z Street insisted that under its "as-is, no 
warranty" contract, E-Z Street had no legal obligation to repair 
the engine. Erickson testified, however, that he would not have 
purchased the vehicle "as is, no warranty" if he had known the 
mileage was over 100,000 miles. The trial court concluded that 
E-Z Street's agents knew or should have known that the odometer had 
"turned over" and that the actual mileage was 100,000 miles more 
than was shown on the odometer. The trial court further concluded 
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that E-Z Street should have written the actual mileage on the 
Odometer Disclosure Statement and the Purchase Agreement (R. 87-88, 
96-98) . 
Erickson, upon finding an old registration form, discovered 
the name of the previous owners of the 1980 van. The previous 
owners informed Erickson that the actual mileage of the van, when 
they sold it, was 146,811 miles (R. 96; Appendix II of this Brief). 
The Court specifically found that as of January of 1989, E-Z Street 
knew or should have known that the odometer had turned over (R. 
97). As a result of E-Z Street's failure to disclose this 
information, and as a result of E-Z Street's choice to "profess 
ignorance as to the actual mileage," the trial court further 
specifically found that "Defendant, through the actions of its 
agents, committed fraud on the plaintiff" (R. 97-98). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred when it did not grant Erickson three 
times the amount of his actual damages, as required by 15 U.S.C. § 
1989(a). However, the trial court did not commit any error in 
judging that E-Z Street violated 15 U.S.C. § 1988, or in rescinding 
the purchase agreement for the vehicle. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING ERICKSON'S CLAIM FOR 
TREBLE DAMAGES PURSUANT TO 15 U.S.C. § 1989 (FEDERAL 
ODOMETER FRAUD STATUTE). 
Erickson is entitled to treble damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1989, 
and the trial court erred in not awarding such damages. Section 
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1989 states: 
(a) Any person who, with intent to defraud, violates any 
requirement imposed under this subchapter shall be liable 
in an amount equal to the sum of -
(1) three times the amount of actual damages 
sustained or $1,500.00 whichever is the 
greater; and 
(2) in the case of any successful action to 
enforce the foregoing liability, the costs of 
the action together with reasonable attorney 
fees as determined by the court. 
15 U.S.C. § 1989. The language of this section is couched in 
mandatory terms: Any person who has violated any requirement of 
subchapter IV—the odometer disclosure requirements--(15 U.S.C. §§ 
1981-91) shall be liable in the amount of three times the amount of 
actual damages or $1,500, whichever is greater.2 The trial court 
only awarded Erickson $1,212.80 in damages. This is less than the 
statutory minimum amount of $1,500. Furthermore, three times the 
amount of Erickson's actual damages would be $3,638.40 ($1,212.80 
time three). The plain language of 15 U.S.C. § 1989 requires that 
the court award Erickson the greater of $1,500 or $3,638.40. 
Erickson respectfully submits that the trial court erred, as a 
matter of law, in awarding less than the statute mandates on its 
own plain terms. 
Accordingly, Erickson respectfully moves this Court to remand 
this case to the trial court with an Order stating that the amount 
of damages awarded to Erickson shall be entered as $3,638.40. 
2
 The statute also provides for reasonable attorney's fees to 
a party who is successful in enforcing liability under the 
subchapter, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1981-91. 
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POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONSTRUED 15 U.S.C. § 1988 TO 
ENTER JUDGMENT AGAINST E-Z STREET FOR PURPOSEFULLY 
PROFESSING IGNORANCE REGARDING THE EXACT MILEAGE OF THE 
VEHICLE. 
The trial court correctly applied the law regarding violations 
of 15 U.S.C. § 1988 in the present case. Section 1988(a)(1) 
requires that any transferor "give the following written disclosure 
to the transferee in connection with the transfer of ownership of 
a motor vehicle: (1) Disclosure of the cumulative mileage 
registered on the odometer." Furthermore, § 1988(b) states: "No 
transferor shall violate any rule prescribed under this section or 
give a false statement to a transferee in making any disclosure 
required by such rule." 15. U.S.C. § 1988(b). In interpreting the 
requirements of 15 U.S.C. § 1988, the trial court relied on Ryan v. 
Edwards, 592 F.2d 756 (4th Cir. 1979), and Haynes v. Manning, 917 
F.2d 450 (10th Cir. 1990). In Haynes, the Tenth Circuit cited Ryan 
approvingly. E-Z Street's claim that the trial court erred in 
applying 15 U.S.C. § 1988 is thus meritless. 
In Ryan, the Fourth Circuit held that a transferor may certify 
the mileage of a vehicle as unknown (i.e., check the box that E-Z 
Street checked) only when he believes that for a reason other than 
the odometer has "rolled over" the mileage is inaccurate. 592 F.2d 
at 760-61. In Ryan, the defendant auto dealership had in its files 
information that indicated that the vehicle at issue had over 
100,000 miles on it. Nevertheless, when the defendant sold the 
automobile, it did not state this on the odometer discloser 
statement. Rather, the dealership merely marked the second box on 
11 
the form that states that the true mileage is unknown. Id. at 759. 
In addressing the requirements of 15 U.S.C. § 1988(a) and (b), 
the Fourth Circuit held that a transferor has a legal duty to use 
reasonable care to determine the exact amount of miles traveled by 
the vehicle. Id. at 760-61. Specifically, the court held that the 
defendant did not comply with the requirements of § 1988 by simply 
recording the mileage that the odometer stated. Id. at 761. The 
Court wrote: 
When a transferor who knows that an odometer has 
"turned over" merely records the numbers appearing on the 
odometer and certifies that the true mileage is unknown, 
the consumer is not simply deprived of accurate mileage 
information; he is actually misled by the form itself. 
We cannot believe that Congress intended to enact a 
statute requiring that consumers be given false or 
misleading information. 
We hold that when a transferor knows that a 
vehicle's odometer has "turned over" after registering 
99,999 miles, the "cumulative mileage" which must be 
stated to satisfy the requirements of § 1988(a)(1) is the 
total of 100,000 plus the number actually appearing on 
the odometer. A transferor may certify the mileage as 
"unknown", § 1988(a)(2), only when he believes that, for 
some other reason, the odometer reading is inaccurate. 
Id. at 760-61 (emphasis added). The Court further explained the 
level of certainty a car dealer must possess regarding whether an 
odometer has "rolled over": "The knowledge of the 'turn over' 
which the transferor must have is not the absolute certitude 
assumed by the district court. If, in the exercise of reasonable 
care, he would have had reason to know that the odometer had 
* turned over', he must disclose this fact on the odometer mileage 
statement." Id. at 761 n.5 (citing Nieto v. Pence, 578 F.2d 640 
(5th Cir. 1978) and Senate Report No. 92-413, Reprinted in 1972 
U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News pp. 3960, 3971). 
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The Tenth Circuit agreed with the reasoning of Ryan in its 
opinion in Haynes v. Manning, 917 F.2d 450 (10th Cir. 1990). In 
that case, the court stated if a defendant sold a vehicle with 
reckless disregard to the actual miles the vehicle had traveled, 
that such actions violated 15 U.S.C. § 1988. Id. at 452-53 (citing 
Ryan v. Edwards, 592 F.2d 756, 762 (4th Cir. 1979)). 
In the present case, the trial court specifically held that 
E-Z Street had disregarded its duty to ascertain, with reasonable 
care, the correct odometer reading of the vehicle. The court 
stated: 
4. There is a conflict in the evidence as to 
whether Defendant's salesman and manager told Plaintiff 
that the Vehicle's mileage was 100,000 miles less than 
the actual mileage. However, the court concludes that 
from January, 1989, Defendant's agents knew or should 
have known that the odometer had "turned over" and that 
the actual mileage was 100,000 miles more than as shown 
on the odometer. 
5. This information was not given to the plaintiff. 
Mr. Memmott should have checked statement (1), and 
written the actual mileage on the Odometer Disclosure 
Statement and the Purchase Agreement. 
[W]hen a transferor knows that a vehicle's odometer 
has "turned over" after registering 99,999 miles, 
the "cumulative mileage" which must be stated to 
satisfy the reguirements of (the Act) is the total 
of 100,000 plus the number actually appearing on 
the odometer." Ryan v. Edwards, 592 P.2d 760. 
6. What the agents did do was to profess ignorance 
as to the actual mileage. Such conduct mislead the 
plaintiff and constitutes reckless disregard for the 
truth if not actual intent to defraud. 
7. The court concludes that Defendant, through the 
actions of its agents, committed fraud on the plaintiff. 
(R. 97-98). 
The holding of the trial thus correctly stated that E-Z Street 
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committed fraud by purposefully not exercising reasonable care to 
learn the exact mileage of the vehicle. This violation was all the 
more egregious when it came to light that E-Z Street had signed a 
document that stated the actual miles of the vehicle (R. 74, in the 
envelop containing the exhibits; see Appendix II of this Brief). 
Even the lead case E-Z Street cites in support of its 
position, Nieto v. Pence, 578 F.2d 640 (5th Cir. 1978), accords 
with the holding of the Ryan case. In Nieto, the Fifth Circuit 
stated: 
We hold that a transferor who lacked actual knowledge may 
still be found to have intended to defraud and thus may 
be civilly liable for a failure to disclose that a 
vehicle's actual mileage is unknown. A transferor may 
not close his eyes to the truth. If a transferor 
reasonably should have known that a vehicle's odometer 
reading was incorrect, although he did not know to a 
certainty the transferee would be defrauded, a court may 
infer that he understood the risk of such an occurrence. 
Id. at 642 (emphasis added). 
Accordingly, Erickson respectfully asks this Court to affirm 
the trial court's judgment that E-Z Street violated 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1988. 
POINT III. 
E-Z STREET'S ARGUMENT THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT 
REQUIRING PROOF OF FRAUD BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE 
BEFORE GRANTING RESCISSION OF THE PURCHASE AGREEMENT IS 
WITHOUT MERIT. 
The trial court's decision to grant rescission of the purchase 
agreement of the vehicle should be sustained on three grounds. 
First, the trial court ruled that E-Z Street had defrauded 
Erickson, and the evidence is clear and convincing that E-Z Street 
had signed a document ttat stated the actual miles of the vehicle 
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to be 146,811 as of March 2, 1989. See Appendix II. Therefore, 
the trial court's decision is consistent with Pace v. Parrish, 247 
P.2d 273 (Utah 1952). Second, E-Z Street did not provide a record 
to this court to review. Without such a record, this Court will 
presume that the evidence below supported the trial court's 
actions. Intermountain Power Agency v. Bowers-Irons Recreation 
Land & Cattle Co., 786 P.2d 250, 252 (Utah App. 1990). Third, on 
the grounds of unilateral mistake, the trial court, in equity, 
could grant the rescission. 
Regarding the first argument, the trial specifically stated 
that it found that E-Z Street's actions defrauded Erickson (R. 97-
98). The court stated that E-Z Street's actions "constituted 
reckless disregard for the truth if not actual intent to defraud" 
(R. 97, emphasis added). Without even making recourse to the oral 
evidence offered at trial, Erickson introduced a document that 
demonstrated that the actual miles on the vehicle were 146,811. 
This document was signed by an agent of E-Z Street. 
Regarding the nine elements of fraud, as explained in Pace, 
each element was met by clear and convincing evidence in this case. 
First, E-Z Street misrepresented the mileage of the vehicle. 
Second, Erickson testified that the mileage was a material fact in 
considering whether to buy to the car. Moreover, 15 U.S.C. § 1981 
and State v. Forshee, 588 P.2d 181, 183 (Utah 1978) (holding that 
mileage on an odometer is likely to affect the judgment of the 
buyer and has a pecuniary significance) both hold that the mileage 
of a vehicle is material to its purchase. Third, the statement 
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that the exact mileage was unknown was false. Fourth, E-Z Street 
either made the statement with reckless disregard for the truth, or 
actively intended to defraud Erickson. Fifth, the purpose for 
making the statements were to induce Erickson to buy the vehicle. 
Sixth, Erickson reasonable relied on such representation. He 
took the vehicle to his father-in-law, but without disassembling 
the engine, there was no way to know the approximate mileage of the 
car. The trial court even stated that "Even though the vehicle was 
relatively old, with low mileage shown on the odometer and the 
condition of the body, the three felt that it was in good 
mechanical condition" (R. 85, emphasis added). Seventh, Erickson 
did buy the car in reliance on the representation of the mileage. 
Eighth, Erickson was induced to take this action because of the 
representation. And ninth, Erickson was damaged in the value of 
the vehicle he received and the damages he suffered when the 
vehicle broke down. All the elements of fraud have been met by 
clear and convincing evidence. 
A second ground why the trial court's remedy of rescission 
should be affirmed is that E-Z Street has not produced a record of 
the proceedings in this matter and is therefore barred from 
bringing arguments regarding the Court's findings and conclusions. 
Utah R. App. P. 11(e)(2) states: 
Transcript required of all evidence regarding challenged 
findings or conclusion. If the appellant intends to urge 
on appeal that a finding or conclusion is unsupported by 
or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant shall 
include in the record a transcript of all evidence 
relevant to such finding or conclusion. 
In Intermountain Power Agei.cv v. Bowers-Irons Recreation Land & 
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Cattle Co., 786 P.2d 250, 252 (Utah App. 1990), this Court stated 
that without a record on appeal, this Court can only presume that 
the judgment was supported by sufficient evidence. Erickson urges 
this Court to follow this presumption in the present case, to 
decline to reach E-Z Street's argument, and to affirm the trial 
court's order of rescission of the purchase agreement. 
A third and final ground for affirming the trial court's order 
granting rescission is that, at the very least, Erickson entered 
into the purchase agreement under a mistaken belief of fact 
regarding the mileage of the vehicle. Obviously E-Z Street did not 
have clean hands in this matter, and on the basis of Erickson's 
unilateral mistake, the purchase agreement should, in justice and 
equity, be rescinded. 
Pursuant to the arguments above, Erickson respectfully 
petitions this Court to affirm the trial court's Order and Judgment 
granting rescission of the purchase agreement. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, Erickson respectfully 
requests this Court to remand the case to the trial court with an 
Order to enter judgment for Erickson in the amount of $3,638.40, 
plus interest at ten percent (10%), to award attorney's fees and 
costs for this appeal, and to affirm the trial court's order and 
judgment in all other respects. 
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E Z STREET AUTO SALES, 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 903000298 
Defendant. 
In this action, the court is called upon to construe the mileage disclosure requirements 
as they apply to an odometer which has "turned over" after registering 100,000 miles. The 
testimony presented at the trial is convoluted and each party challenges the others accuracy as 
to what occurred. Upon consideration of all the evidence, the court finds for the plaintiff as 
hereinafter set forth. 
September, 1989, defendant, E Z Street Auto Sales offered a 1980 Volkswagen 
Camper Van for sale. The record is not clear when defendant acquired this vehicle for sale, 
but the facts establish that defendant had it inspected on January 25, 1989. The inspection 
certificate indicates that the owner is E Z Street Auto Sales and the mileage was 46,811 
miles. An affidavit filed with the Motor Vehicle Department of the State of Utah by the 
previous owners, Steven P. and Robyn Duncan, conveying the vehicle to defendant, indicates 
that the actual odometer reading was 146,811 miles. 
On September 26, 1989, the plaintiff, Mark Erickson, purchased the Camper Van 
from the defendant. Approximately one week prior to the sale date, plaintiff had test-driven 
the vehicle. Paul Lives, a salesman for defendant, accompanied plaintiff on the test-drive. 
Plaintiff stopped at his father-in-law's home which is only a short distance from defendant's 
lot. Plaintiffs wife and father-in-law inspected the vehicle. At this time, the odometer 
showed the mileage to be around 48,800 miles. Even though the vehicle was relatively old, 
with the low mileage shown on the odometer and the condition of the body, the three felt that 
it was in good mechanical condition. 
ss 
Plaintiff and Mr. Lives discussed the mileage as shown on the odometer. Plaintiff 
remembers that Mr. Lives said the miles shown were the actual miles. Mr. Lives 
remembers the conversation differently. He testified that he told plaintiff to have the vehicle 
checked by a mechanic since there was no way to determine the actual mileage on a car that 
old. During the week plaintiff talked on the phone with Ronald Memmott, the manager of 
defendant. The two mostly talked about the sale price of the vehicle. Mr. Memmott never 
told plaintiff what the actual mileage was. 
On the date of the sale Mr. Memmott handled the negotiations for defendant. Both 
Federal and State law require that the seller state the mileage of the vehicle upon transfer of 
ownership. The Odometer Disclosure Statement is the document that conveys this 
information. Mr. Memmott prepared all of the necessary documents of sale. On the 
Purchase Agreement, on the line asking for the odometer reading, Mr. Memmott wrote 
48,831. The Odometer Disclosure Statement, as completed by Mr. Memmott, states the 
odometer "now reads 48,831 (no tenths) miles and to the best of my knowledge 
that it reflects the actual mileage of the vehicle....unless one of the following statements is 
checked. 
(1) I hereby certify that to the best of my knowledge the odometer reading 
reflects the amount of mileage in excess of its mechanical limits. 
(2) I hereby certify that the odometer reading is NOT the actual mileage. 
WARNING - ODOMETER DISCREPANCY." 
Mr. Memmott checked statement (2). Mr. Memmott denies that he misrepresented the 
mileage of the vehicle to plaintiff, even though he knew that the actual mileage was not 
48,831 miles. When statement (2) was checked, people were put on notice that there was an 
odometer discrepancy. Both plaintiff and his wife testified that Mr. Memmott told them that 
the 48,831 miles, as shown on the odometer, were the actual miles of the vehicle. 
Plaintiff agreed to pay a total purchase price of $4,291.00 ($4,266.00, plus $25.00 
for an out of state permit). Plaintiff paid for the purchase by using two credit cards by 
charging $3,000.00 on one card and $1,291.00 on the second. Plaintiff bought the vehicle 
"as is" and signed statements that he realized the vehicle was sold without any warranties. 
Plaintiff drove the vehicle to his home in Evanston, Wyoming. During the first week 
of operation he repaired the brakes, tail lights, and door locks, and installed a new door 
rear-view mirror, all at a cost of $123.24. At the beginning of the second week, plaintiff, 
his wife, and one year old daughter left Evanston to drive to Los Angeles, California. The 
car broke down about 80 miles north of Las Vegas, Nevada. It was towed to Las Vegas. 
Plaintiff was told by a Volkswagen repair shop that the engine needed a complete overhaul. 
That the cost of such an overhaul would be in the neighborhood of $2,000.00. He was also 
told that from the condition of the engine it was evident that the actual mileage was greatly 
in excess of the mileage figure shown on the odometer. 
t* 
So as not to ruin their vacation trip to California, plaintiff rented a car in Las Vegas 
and continued on to Los Angeles. On their return trip, plaintiff rented a truck large enough 
to tow the Camper Van and brought it back to his father-in-law's home in South Salt Lake, 
Utah. It cost $150.34 to rent the car and $939.22 to rent the truck. The father-in-law, who 
is an experienced Volkswagen mechanic, disassembled part of the engine in an attempt to 
repair it. The engine showed evidence of many miles of use, and he determined that a 
complete engine overhaul was necessary. 
Plaintiff was able to discover the name of the previous owners of the 1980 van. They 
informed him that the actual mileage of the van, when they sold it, was 146,811 miles. 
Plaintiff 's negotiations to have the defendant repair the engine were unsuccessful. Defendant 
insisted that under it's "as-is, no warranty" contract it had no legal obligation to repair the 
engine. Plaintiff testified that he would not have purchased the vehicle "as is, no warranty" 
if he had known the mileage was over 100,000 miles. It is plaintiffs contention that Mr. 
Memmott knew or should have known that the correct mileage was 148,831 miles. That 
defendant committed fraud when both its salesman and manager misrepresented the actual 
mileage of the vehicle. That by putting the odometer reading of 48,831 miles on the 
Odometer Disclosure Statement and the Purchase Agreement, defendant violated the Federal 
Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1991 (federal 
odometer statute). 
The U. S. Congress in § 1981 stated its findings that purchasers, when buying 
motor vehicles, rely heavily on the odometer reading as an index of the condition and value 
of such vehicle; that purchasers are entitled to rely on the odometer reading as an accurate 
reflection of the mileage actually traveled by the vehicle; that an accurate indication of the 
mileage traveled by a motor vehicle assists the purchaser in determining its safety and 
reliability. In actions brought under this act, courts have enforced strict accountability on 
any person transferring ownership of a vehicle. The standard of proof in actions based on 
fraud is the preponderance of evidence standard. The "intent to defraud" required for a 
violation includes action taken with reckless disregard, as well as action taken with the 
specific intent to deceive or cheat potential purchasers. See Ryan vs. Edwards. 592 F 2d 756 
(1979): Haynes vs. Manning. 917 F2d 450 (1990). 
In Utah, it is recognized that the mileage on the odometer of a used car is a factor 
which is likely to affect the judgment of the buyer and has pecuniary significance. State v. 
Forshee. 588 P.2d 181. Plaintiff testified that he would have made a different deal, or no 
deal at all, had he known the actual mileage of the vehicle. 
There is a conflict in the evidence as to whether defendant's salesman and manager 
told the plaintiff that the mileage of the vehicle was 100,00 miles less than the actual 
mileage. However, the court finds that from January, 1989, defendant's agents knew or 
%? 
should have known that the odometer had "turned over" and that the actual mileage was 
100,000 miles iflore than as shown on the odometer. This information was not given to the 
plaintiff. Mr. Memmott should have checked statement (1), and written the actual mileage 
on the Odometer Disclosure Statement and the Purchase Agreement. 
"...when a transferor knows that a vehicle's odometer has "turned over" after 
registering 99,999 miles, the "cumulative mileage" which must be stated to satisfy 
the requirements of [the Act] is the total of 100,000 plus the numbef actually 
appearing on the odometer." Ryan v. Edwards. 592 P2d 760. 
What the agents did do was to profess ignorance as to the actual mileage. Such conduct 
mislead the plaintiff and constitutes reckless disregard for the truth if not actual intent to 
defraud. 
The couft finds that defendant, through the actions of its agents, coitmiitted fraud on 
the plaintiff. Plaintiff is granted judgment against the defendant as follows: (1) The Purchase 
Agreement is rescinded. Plaintiffs obligation, as evidenced by the credit card charges, is 
cancelled. (2) plaintiff is awarded damages of $1,212.80, interest at the rate of 10% per 
annum from December 1, 1989, and his court costs. (3) Since the provisions of the Federal 
Act also apply to state actions (see § 1989), plaintiff is awarded $1,500.00 attorney's fees. 
(4) No punitive damages are awarded. 
Stated \SYV2> ^ T * 4 » 4&j <tf Nwssstoes, \992. 
L. H Griffifys, Circuit Judge 
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E.Z. STREET AUTO, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 903000298 
This matter came on for trial on September 29, 1992 and 
October 19, 1992 before the Honorable Leroy H. Griffiths, Judge 
of The Circuit Court of the State of Utah, Salt Lake County, 
Murray Department. 
The plaintiff, Mark Erickson, appeared in person and through 
his attorney, James C. Haskins and Jeff Hollingworth. The 
defendant, E.Z. Street Auto, appeared in person and through its 
attorney, John D. Russell. Evidence was produced by each of the 
parties through testimony and exhibits. At the conclusion of the 
presentation of testimony and exhibits, both parties rested. The 
court having heard all the evidence and being fully advised in 
the premises now makes its findings of fact and conclusions of 
law as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. In September 1989, Defendant E.Z. Street Auto offered a 
fx 
1980 Volkswagen camper van ("Vehicle") for sale. 
2. On or about September 26, 1989, Plaintiff purchased the 
Vehicle from Defendant. 
3. Plaintiff agreed to pay a total purchase price of 
$4,291.00 ($4,266.00, plus $25.00 for an out of state permit). 
Plaintiff paid for the Vehicle's purchase using two credit cards. 
.Plaintiff charged $1,291.00 on his American Express card and 
$3,000.00 on his Visa card. 
4. Approximately one week prior to purchasing the Vehicle, 
Plaintiff test drove the Vehicle accompanied by one of 
Defendant's salesman, Paul Lives. 
5. While on the test drive, Plaintiff stopped at his 
father-in-law's home and Plaintiff's wife and father-in-law 
inspected the Vehicle. At this time the odometer indicated that 
the mileage on the Vehicle was approximately 48,800 miles. 
6. Even though the Vehicle was relatively old, given the 
low mileage shown on the odometer and the condition of the body, 
the three felt that the Vehicle was in good condition. 
7. Plaintiff and Mr. Lives discussed the mileage shown on 
the odometer. Plaintiff testified that Mr. Lives told Plaintiff 
that the miles shown were the actual miles. Mr. Lives testified 
that he told Plaintiff to have the Vehicle checked by a mechanic 
because there was no way to determine the actual mileage on a car 
that old. 
8. During the week prior to the Vehicle's purchase, 
Plaintiff spoke with Defendant's manager, Ronald Memmott, 
2 
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regarding purchase terms. Both plaintiff and his wife testified 
that Mr. Memmott told them that the 48,831 miles, as shown on the 
Vehicle's odometer, were the actual miles of the Vehicle. 
9. On September 26, 1989, Mr. Memmott, on behalf of 
Defendant, finalized the Vehicle's purchase with Plaintiff. 
10. Mr. Memmott prepared all of the necessary documents 
transferring ownership of the Vehicle to Plaintiff. 
11. Mr. Memmott prepared the Purchase Agreement on which he 
indicated the Vehicle's mileage as 48,831. 
12. Mr. Memmott prepared the Odometer Disclosure Statement 
which stated in pertinent part: 
I E.Z. Street Auto state that the odometer . . . now 
reads 48,831 (no tenths) miles and to the best of my 
knowledge that it reflects the actual mileage of the 
Vehicle . . . unless one of the following statements is 
checked. 
(1) I hereby certify that to the best of my knowledge 
the odometer reading reflects the amount of mileage in 
excess of its mechanical limits. 
(2) I hereby certify that the odometer reading is NOT 
the actual mileage. WARNING ODOMETER DISCREPANCY. 
13. Mr. Memmott checked statement (2) and at trial denied 
that he misrepresented the mileage of the Vehicle to Plaintiff, 
even though he knew that the actual mileage was far in excess of 
48,831 miles. When statement (2) was checked, people were put on 
notice that there was an odometer discrepancy. 
14. Plaintiff bought the Vehicle "as is" and signed 
statements that he realized the Vehicle was sold without any 
warranties. 
15. Plaintiff drove the Vehicle to his home in Evanston, 
Wyoming and during the first week of operation he repaired the 
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brakes, tail lights, and door locks, and installed a new door 
rear-view mirror, all at a cost of $123.24. 
16. At the beginning of the second week, Plaintiff, his 
wife, and their one year old daughter left Evanston to drive to 
Los Angeles, California. 
17. Approximately 80 miles north of Las Vegas, Nevada the 
.Vehicle broke down and had to be towed to Las Vegas. 
18. While in Las Vegas, Plaintiff was told by a Volkswagen 
repair shop that the engine needed a complete overhaul at an 
estimated cost of $2,000.00. He was also told that from the 
condition of the engine it was evident that the actual mileage 
was greatly in excess of the mileage figure shown on the 
odometer. 
19. So as not to ruin their trip to California, plaintiff 
rented a car in Las Vegas and continued traveling to Los Angeles. 
On their return trip, Plaintiff rented a truck large enough to 
tow the Camper Van and brought it back to his father-in-law's 
home in South Salt Lake, Utah. It cost $150.34 to rent the car 
and $939.22 to rent the truck. 
20. The father-in-law, who is an experienced Volkswagen 
mechanic, disassembled part of the engine in an attempt to repair 
it. The engine showed evidence of many miles of use, and he 
determined that a complete engine overhaul was necessary. 
21. Plaintiff's negotiations to have the defendant repair 
the engine were unsuccessful. Defendant insisted that under it's 
"as-is, no warranty" contract it had no legal obligation to 
4 
repair the engine. 
22. Plaintiff, upon finding an old registration form, 
discovered the name of the previous owners of the 1980 van. They 
informed him that the actual mileage of the van, when they sold 
it, was 146,811 miles. 
23. Plaintiff testified that he would not have purchased 
the Vehicle "as is, no warranty" if he had known the mileage was 
over 100,000 miles. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The U.S. Congress stated in its findings of the Federal 
Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 
1981-1991 ("Federal Odometer Statute"), that purchasers, when 
buying motor Vehicles, rely heavily on .the odometer reading as an 
index of the condition and value of such Vehicle; that purchasers 
are entitled to rely on the odometer reading as an accurate 
reflection of the mileage actually traveled by the Vehicle; that 
an accurate indication of the mileage traveled by a motor Vehicle 
assists the purchaser in determining its safety and reliability. 
2. In actions brought under the Federal Odometer Statute, 
courts have enforced strict accountability on any person 
transferring ownership of a Vehicle. The standard of proof in 
actions based on violation of the Federal Odometer Statute 
include action taken with reckless disregard, as well as action 
taken with the specific intent to deceive or cheat potential 
purchasers. See, Ryan v. Edwards, 592 F.2d 756 (1979); Havnes v. 
Manning, 917 F.2d 450 (1990). 
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3. In Utah, it is recognized that the mileage on the 
odometer of a used a car is a factor which is likely to affect 
the judgment of the buyer and has pecuniary significance. State 
v. Forshee, 588 P 2d, 181. Plaintiff testified that he would 
have made a different deal, or no deal at all, had he known 
Vehicle's actual mileage. 
4. There is a conflict in the evidence as to whether 
Defendant's salesman and manager told Plaintiff that the 
Vehicle's mileage was 100,000 miles less than the actual mileage. 
However, the court concludes that from January, 1989, Defendant's 
agents knew or should have known that the odometer had "turned 
over" and that the actual mileage was 100,000 miles more than as 
shown on the odometer. 
5. This information was not given to the plaintiff. Mr. 
Memmott should have checked statement (1), and written the actual 
mileage on the Odometer Disclosure Statement and the Purchase 
Agreement. 
[W]hen a transferor knows that a vehicle's odometer has 
"turned over" after registering 99,999 miles, the 
"cumulative mileage" which must be stated to satisfy the 
requirements of (the Act) is the total of 100,000 plus the 
number actually appearing on the odometer." 
Ryan v. Edwards, 592 P2d 760. 
6. What the agents did do was to profess ignorance as to 
the actual mileage. Such conduct mislead the plaintiff and 
constitutes reckless disregard for the truth if not actual intent 
to defraud. 
7. The court concludes that Defendant, through the actions 
6 
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of its agents, committed fraud on the plaintiff. 
8. Plaintiff should be granted judgment against the 
defendant as follows: 
(1) The Purchase Agreement should be rescinded. 
Plaintiff's obligation, as evidenced by the credit card charges, 
should be cancelled; 
(2) Plaintiff should be awarded damages of $1,212.80, 
interest at the rate of 10% per annum from December 1, 1989, and 
his court costs of $104.00; 
(3) Since the provisions of the Federal Act also apply 
to state actions (see § 1989), Plaintiff should be awarded 
$1,500.00 attorney's fees. 
(4) No punitive damages should be awarded. 
DATED this day of /^V^X^v^^w^ , 1993. 
By the Court: 
L. H Griff iths/A£/ircuit Judge 
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E.Z. STREET AUTO, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 903000298 
This matter came on for trial on September 29, 1992 and 
October 19, 1992 before the Honorable Leroy H. Griffiths, Judge 
of The Circuit Court of the State of Utah, Salt Lake County, 
Murray Department and the court having made its Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Plaintiff is granted judgment against the Defendant; 
2. The Purchase Agreement is rescinded; 
3. Plaintiff's obligation, as evidenced by the credit card 
charges, is cancelled; 
4. Plaintiff is awarded damages of $1,212.80, plus 
interest at the rate of 10% per annum from December 1, 1989 until 
paid in full. 
5. Plaintiff is awarded his court costs of $104.00; 
n 
6. Plaintiff is awarded $1,500.00 attorney's fees. 
7. Plaintiff is not awarded any punitive damages. 
DATED this /><M day of <^^J\A*ULO+*I 1993. 
By theJ2o\rtft: -^  
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